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The Transpennine Route Upgrade (TRU) is upgrading the 76-mile railway between Manchester, Huddersfield, Leeds and York through electrification, additional tracks, digital signalling and station reconstruction, with full-programme cost forecasts rising from £289 million at announcement (2011 prices) to £9-11.5 billion by late 2021 and £3.5 billion confirmed at Spending Review 2025 for improvements to be delivered by the early 2030s. This paper critically evaluates the programme's commercial governance and technical risk mitigation across the pre-contract and post-contract phases. Because the reviewed public sources identify TRU's main works with bespoke alliance frameworks rather than a verified NEC4 Engineering and Construction Contract (ECC) Option C form, NEC4 ECC Option C is used as a conditional analytical benchmark for target-cost governance, not as a claim about the executed contracts. A qualitative documentary case study of the September 2024 TRU West Alliance award (Huddersfield-Leeds, £2 billion) and the Huddersfield corridor works, with TRU East's Church Fenton-York section as contextual reference, combines National Audit Office, departmental, Treasury, procurement-notice and supplier evidence (cut-off 18 October 2026). The findings are threefold: pre-2021 sponsor scope and funding instability, costing an estimated £190 million in obsolete development work, constrained the credibility of delivery baselines, the programme's matured practices (the two-stage design-maturity-then-target-cost strategy of the 2026 W2BC tunnel tender, capability-weighted supplier selection) converge with Option C logic, and documented delivery outcomes - Church Fenton-York completed in August 2025 and reported on time and on budget, and Huddersfield station reopening in its planned temporary state on 29 September 2025 after a 30-day blockade - are positive where scope was settled. The principal residual structural risk, systems integration around digital signalling contracted outside the alliances, is associated with a pre-contract boundary decision. The paper concludes that target-cost collaboration manages residual uncertainty but cannot substitute for stable scope, mature interfaces and a credible funding baseline